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Abstract
How do changes in agricultural productivity aﬀect firms? Using the predictions of
a simple multi-sector general equilibrium model of the local economy and exploit-
ing weather-induced agricultural volatility across India, I estimate the response of
manufacturing firms to changes in agricultural productivity. I show that negative
agricultural productivity shocks lower the cost of labor but that this does not cause
firms to hire more. Firms’ production and employment in fact decrease because the
shocks also reduce local income and hence the demand that firms face. My estimates
provide evidence for a significant local demand eﬀect. I then use my framework to
show that this has key policy implications. I examine the introduction of a rural
workfare program and assess how it aﬀects firms. I show that the program attenuates
the impact of negative agricultural shocks on firms because of its counter-cyclical
eﬀects on local wage and demand for manufacturing goods. The results highlight
how policies that target households and increase their income can aﬀect local market
size and therefore the industrial sector through their general equilibrium eﬀects.
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1 Introduction
Many firms in the developing world operate in economies that are primarily agricultural,
where a large fraction of the population resides in rural areas and agriculture accounts for
a substantial share of production and employment. In 2005, 70% of all manufacturing es-
tablishments in India were located in rural areas and employment in these establishments
accounted for 60% of total Indian manufacturing employment1. Given these magnitudes,
it is natural to ask how conditions in the rural economy aﬀect firms and, in particular,
whether rural incomes matter in determining the demand that firms face. This question is
the focus of a classical literature that examines the role of market size for industrialization
(e.g. Murphy et al., 1989a, 1989b). It is also at the core of a large literature on the role of
agricultural development in the growth of the non-farm sector. Some scholars have argued
that increases in agricultural productivity are a pre-condition for industrial development,
and classical models of structural transformation have formalized this by showing how
productivity growth can generate demand for manufacturing goods2. A diﬀerent strand
of the literature, on the other hand, stressed the key distinction between open and closed
economies, and noted how in open economies an increase in agricultural productivity can
in fact crowd-out industrial production because manufacturing has to compete with the
agricultural sector for labor3.
This long-standing question has renewed importance for developing countries today,
as the reduction in transportation costs and the consequent increased mobility of goods
and factors may have changed the influence of local conditions. In particular, do local
rural incomes play an important role in determining the economic opportunities of firms,
or do integrated factor and product markets make local incomes irrelevant?
In this paper, I provide direct evidence on this question by examining the dependence
of firms on the local rural economy in the context of India. The analysis entails two
intertwined parts. First, I exploit weather-induced agricultural productivity fluctuations
to study how changes in agricultural incomes aﬀect firms. Second, I take advantage of
the introduction in rural areas of a large-scale workfare program, the National Rural
Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), and assess the eﬀects it had on rural incomes and
wages, and how these eﬀects translated to the rural industrial sector.
To guide the empirical analysis, I provide a simple multi-sector general equilibrium
1Author’s calculations based on data from the Annual Survey of Industries and National Sample
Survey (Schedule 2.2, Manufacturing Enterprises) for the year 2005-2006.
2See Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Lewis, 1954; Rostow, 1960; Ngai and Pissarides (2007), Baumol (1967),
Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie (2001), Gollin, Parente and Rogerson (2002).
3See Matsuyama (1992), Foster and Rosenzweig (2004, 2008).
2
model of the local economy that illustrates how agricultural productivity shocks aﬀect
the local economy and are transmitted to firms through factor and product markets. I
then extend the model to characterize how the introduction of a workfare program aﬀects
this transmission and impacts firms.
I model an economy with three distinct productive sectors: agriculture, a tradable
non-farm sector and a non-tradable non-farm sector. Agricultural goods are assumed to
be traded across space, while goods in the non-farm sector are either traded across space
or sold locally. The distinction between firms that sell traded vs. non-traded goods is
crucial because firms will be aﬀected diﬀerently by changes in local conditions. Consider
a positive shock to agricultural productivity. This has two eﬀects on local firms. On the
one hand, it induces an increase in the cost of labor because increased demand for labor
in agriculture raises the equilibrium wage. On the other hand, it positively aﬀects local
incomes and thus potentially the demand that firms face. Firms that sell goods in global
markets are only aﬀected by the first channel (wage channel) and their activity will be
crowded-out by increases in agricultural productivity. Firms that sell their goods to local
households will instead also benefit from the second channel (demand channel) and their
activity may in fact be crowded-in by increases in agricultural productivity.
The model derives predictions for the local eﬀects of agricultural productivity on
equilibrium wage, income, and consumption, as well as sectoral employment, production
and prices. The model predictions are then examined using a unique combination of firm,
household and district-level data from India. The empirical analysis requires a source of
exogenous variation in agricultural productivity. I rely on the fact that in rural India a
large fraction of agriculture is rainfed and agricultural productivity depends highly on
monsoon rainfall. Variation in rainfall realizations across Indian districts and over time
is used to estimate the response of equilibrium outcomes to agricultural productivity.
The first main result of the paper is that local rural incomes are an important determi-
nant of the demand that firms face. I show that firms respond to a negative agricultural
productivity shock by reducing production and employment. This holds true even though
the local wage decreases, suggesting that, while both eﬀects are at play, the demand eﬀect
more than compensate the wage eﬀect. I also show that, consistently with the model,
the result is driven by firms that produce locally-traded good, while firms that produce
traded goods increase their activity, although the estimated elasticity is not statistically
significant. This set of results illustrates how an economically important share of firms
does not rely on national, or even state-level markets. We may have expected the mobility
of goods and factors to be suﬃcient to limit the influence of local conditions. The evi-
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dence in this paper shows that this is not that case and that, instead, local rural incomes
continue to play an important role in determining the economic opportunities of firms.
Understanding how firms are aﬀected by the conditions in the local economy has
important policy implications. Researchers and policymakers interested in firms in low-
income countries generally focus their attention on policies that aﬀect firms directly.
The mechanisms I describe, on the other hand, underscore how policies targeted to the
agricultural sector or aimed at rural households may have important consequences for
firms because of their general equilibrium implications. Ignoring these general equilibrium
eﬀects can lead to a partial, and possibly misleading, assessment of the impact of policies.
In the second part of this paper, I provide direct evidence for the policy relevance of
linkages in the local economy, and examine the impact of a large-scale workfare program,
the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), introduced in rural India in
2006.
The program entitles every household in rural India to 100 days of minimum-wage
public employment per year. The type of work generated by the program is low-wage,
unskilled manual work, often in construction. According to government administrative
data, during 2010-2011, the program generated a total of 2.3 billion person-days of em-
ployment, providing employment to 53 million households in rural India4. The size of
the program makes it one of the largest and most ambitious public-works employment
schemes ever attempted in history.
In this part, I take advantage of the timing of NREGA implementation across districts
to assess how the program aﬀected the local economy and firms. I introduce NREGA in
the model as an additional sector that hires at a fixed wage (the program statutory
wage) and obtain predictions for the impact of the program on equilibrium wage, income
and sectoral outcomes. Intuitively, the availability of public employment guarantees to
local workers the possibility to be remunerated at the NREGA wage. This induces a
wage floor, that is, it prevents the equilibrium wage from falling below the NREGA wage
during times of low agricultural productivity. Because of its stabilization eﬀect on local
wage, the program may also stabilize local income and demand. That is, it may be able
to support consumption during local downturns and behave as a counter-cyclical stimulus
policy. This, in turn, may stabilize industrial production and employment.
In the empirical analysis, I estimate the response of equilibrium outcomes to agri-
cultural productivity before and after the introduction of NREGA. The comparison of
elasticities before and after the program allows me to assess whether NREGA changes
4Figures are from the oﬃcial NREGA website nrega.nic.in.
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the way in which agricultural productivity shocks aﬀect the local economy.
The second main finding of the paper is that NREGA, through its eﬀects on local
wage and demand, aﬀects firms. I show that the program acts as a local stabilization
policy and attenuates the pro-cyclical response of local wage, consumption, and firms’
outcomes to agricultural productivity shocks. The evidence supports the mechanisms
outlined in the model. First, I show that public employment under NREGA strongly
responds to adverse agricultural shocks. That is, workers resort to NREGA to a larger
extent when the local economy is hit by worse agricultural productivity shocks. This
provides evidence for the key channel through which the stabilization eﬀect of NREGA is
operating. Second, I show that local rainfall has a much smaller impact on local wage and
consumption after the introduction of the program, even though it continues to have an
impact on agricultural productivity. This suggests that NREGA acts on the relationship
between agricultural productivity and local income, and attenuates the response of the
latter to shocks. Finally, I show that, because of its eﬀect on local income, the program
attenuates the relationship between agricultural productivity and firms’ production and
employment.
This paper relates to previous work in multiple literatures. First, it relates to a
classical literature that examines the role of agricultural productivity in the development
of the non-farm sector5. This paper is most closely linked to the more recent work in this
literature, which empirically tests how improvements in agricultural productivity aﬀect
the rest of the economy (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2004; Hornbeck and Keskin, 2012; Bustos
et al., 2013; Marden, 2015).
Second, in the literature on NREGA, this paper is most closely related to Imbert and
Papp (2015), Berg et al. (2013) and Zimmerman (2014), that study the impact of NREGA
on wages, and Fetzer (2014), that shows that NREGA reduced conflict by attenuating
the relationship between rainfall and violence. While there is a growing literature on
NREGA, only few papers consider its general equilibrium implications, and those that
do only focus on the impact on wages. My work shows that it is crucial to consider also
the impact that the program had on demand and prices of goods sold locally. This is
important because the eﬀect of the program on demand can more than compensate its
eﬀect on wage and, as I show, result in a crowd-in of local economic activity in the non-
farm sector. To the best of my knowledge, no previous work has examined whether and
how workfare programs, including NREGA, aﬀect the industrial sector. The closest paper
in this regard is Magruder (2013), which used the timing of increase in minimum wages
5See Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Schultz, 1953; Lewis, 1954; Rostow, 1960
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across Indonesian provinces in the 1990s to test the predictions of a big push model.
Third, this paper relates to a large literature in development economics on the pro-
ductivity risk that households in low-income countries face, the extent to which they are
insured against such risk and their consumption smoothing capabilities (e.g. Binswanger
and Rosenzweig, 1993; Townsend, 1994; Udry, 1994). In this literature, this paper is
most closely related to Jayachandran (2006), which shows how poverty, low mobility and
credit constraints exacerbate productivity risk. Her framework only considers the agricul-
tural sector. I build on that framework adding the non-farm sector to the analysis, and
showing how the cross-sector linkages in the local economy can be additional sources of
productivity risk exacerbation.
Fourth, the analysis and the predictions on tradable vs. non-tradable sectors are
related to the recent literature on trade and volatility (Burgess and Donaldson, 2010;
Allen and Atkin; 2015), which shows how trade integration can aﬀect the volatility faced
by local households.
More broadly, this work connects to the economics literature on local economic growth
(Busso, Gregory, and Kline, 2013; Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2013; Alcott and Keniston,
2015; Moretti, 2010, 2011) and to the macro literature on the role of sector-specific shocks
in macro fluctuations (Acemoglu et al., 2012; Caliendo et al., 2015).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a model of the local
economy to derive the local eﬀects of agricultural productivity shocks and to illustrate the
implications of the introduction of NREGA. Section 3 explains the various sources of data
used and how the key variables are constructed. Section 4 provides a brief background on
NREGA. Section 5 develops the empirical strategy that is used to identify the impact of
agricultural productivity on the local economy and the role of NREGA. Section 5 presents
the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
In this section I present a simple multi-sector general equilibrium model of the local rural
economy to guide the empirical work. The purpose of the model is twofold. First, I
illustrate how shocks to the local farm-sector are transmitted to the non-farm economy
through linkages in the labor and goods market. In particular, I show how agricultural
shocks have diﬀerent eﬀects on firms that produce traded vs. non-traded goods, because
of the key role that local agricultural income plays for the demand of non-traded goods.
Second, I illustrate the implications that the introduction of a public-works program has
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for the response of the local economy to agricultural volatility.
The model draws from Jayachandran (2006), Foster and Rosenzweig (2004) and Mat-
suyama (1992), and provides predictions that are the object of the empirical analysis.
2.1 A Multi-Sector Model of the Local Rural Economy
2.1.1 Setup
Consider a small open economy (district) with three productive sectors: agriculture, non-
farm tradable sector and non-farm non-tradable sector, indexed by j = {A,M, S} respec-
tively.
Each sector is modeled as a representative firm and produces output Yj using labor
nj. The production functions are Yj = ✓jn↵j , where ✓j > 0 represents a sector-specific
productivity parameter. Productivity in the agricultural sector, ✓A, captures weather-
related productivity shocks and is the driving force in the model.
Firms in the agricultural and non-farm tradable sectors sell goods into global markets,
so prices pA and pM are exogenously given. Firms in the non-tradable sector instead
sell goods to local agents, so price pS is endogenous and determined by local demand
conditions.
Labor receives wage w. I assume that labor is immobile across districts but is mobile
across sectors. Given local mobility of labor, in equilibrium the wage w will be equated
across sectors.
The local economy has a mass one of homogenous agents. Agents are endowed with one
unit of time, which I assume they supply inelastically to the labor market. In equilibrium
total employment in the three sectors must equal total local labor supply, and equilibrium
wage is determined by the labor market clearing condition:
nA + nM + nS = 1.
Agents in the local economy have Cobb-Douglas preferences over agricultural goods
(cA), traded goods (cM) and non-traded goods (cS), with share of non-traded goods equal
to  . Agents receive profits from the agricultural and non-tradable sector, while I assume
that profits from the tradable sector do not accrue locally6. This is due to the fact that
firms in this sector are likely large factories owned by individuals outside the district
of interest. In the model, this ensures that a positive shock to agriculture increases
6I could alternatively assume that a share µ > 0 of tradable sector profits accrues locally. The key
assumption is not µ = 0, but µ < 1.
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consumption of non-traded goods instead of increasing wages and price of non-traded
goods proportionally.
The budget constraint is thus:
X
j2{A,M,S}
pjcj = ⇡A + ⇡S + w.
Utility maximization with Cobb-Douglas preferences requires the expenditure share on
non-traded goods to be equal to  , so I have:
pscs =   (⇡A + ⇡S + w) .
In equilibrium, the price of non-traded goods, pS, adjusts to equilibrate non-tradable sup-
ply and demand, and is determined endogenously to satisfy the market clearing condition:
YS = cS.
2.1.2 Comparative Statics: The Local Eﬀects of a Change in Agricultural
Productivity
In this section I consider the eﬀects of a shock to agricultural productivity on agents and
firms in the local economy. I derive the comparative statics for a change in the agricultural
productivity parameter ✓A7.
Given that the wage and the price of the non-traded good must equilibrate their
respective markets, it is possible to solve explicitly for the equilibrium wage and the allo-
cation of labor across the three sectors. Specifically, households’ utility maximization and
firms’ profit maximization, together with market clearing, imply that at the competitive
equilibrium:
w =
↵
h
(pA✓A)
1
1 ↵ + C (pM✓M)
1
1 ↵
i1 ↵
(1   )1 ↵ (1)
7The empirical analysis relies on variation in rainfall R, so that, for any outcome of interest y, I
estimate the reduced form impact of rainfall, that is, @y@R . The assumption implicit to the empirical
analysis (which will be tested below) is that agricultural productivity is a function of rainfall, so I can
exploit the relation @y@R =
@y
@✓A
@✓A
@R . Notice how this implies that the rainfall elasticities estimated are a
function of @✓A@R , that is, the strength of the impact that rainfall has on agricultural productivity. In the
empirical analysis, I show how such strength depends on the extent of irrigation available in the district.
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nj =
(1  )(pj✓j)
1
1 ↵
(pA✓A)
1
1 ↵+C(pM✓M )
1
1 ↵
for j 2 {A,M} (2)
nS =
 
h
(pA✓A)
1
1 ↵ + ↵ (pM✓M)
1
1 ↵
i
(pA✓A)
1
1 ↵ + C (pM✓M)
1
1 ↵
(3)
where C = 1   (1  ↵).
Prediction 1. A positive shock to agricultural productivity ✓A increases the equilibrium
wage: @w@✓A > 0.
The result follows immediately from Equation 1. Increases in ✓A increase the marginal
return to labor in agriculture, increasing the demand for labor in agriculture and driving
up the equilibrium wage. Notice how, by assuming inelastic labor supply, I am excluding
the possibility that the increase in wage induces an increase in labor supply, which would
in turn mitigate the wage increase. Inelastic labor supply simplifies the analysis but it is
not crucial for this result. What is crucial is that labor supply is not fully elastic. If labor
supply was fully elastic, changes in agricultural productivity would not aﬀect wages, and
all adjustment would occur through migration and/or movement into the labor force.
Prediction 2. A positive shock to agricultural productivity ✓A induces a reallocation of
agents towards the local farm sector: @nA@✓A > 0.
The result follows immediately from Equation 2. It is also immediate to show that
agricultural production and profits respond pro-cyclically, that is, @yA@✓A > 0 and
@⇡A
@✓A
> 0.
Prediction 3. A positive shock to agricultural productivity ✓A has opposite eﬀects on
the tradable and non-tradable components of the local non-farm economy. Specifically:
• The employment of local tradable firms moves counter-cyclically: @nM@✓A < 0.
• The employment of local non-tradable firms moves pro-cyclically: @nS@✓A > 0. In
addition, the price of non-tradable goods moves pro-cyclically: @pS@✓A > 0.
The results follows immediately from Equations 2 and 3, and from the closed-form
expression for the equilibrium price of the non-traded good:
pS =
1
✓S
"
 
1   
#1 ↵ h
(pA✓A)
1
1 ↵ + ↵ (pM✓M)
1
1 ↵
i1 ↵
. (4)
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From the result on employment and prices, it can be easily shown that agricultural
productivity also has opposite eﬀects on the production and profitability of the tradable
and non-tradable sector. Specifically, @yM@✓A < 0 and
@⇡M
@✓A
< 0 for the tradable sector, and
@yS
@✓A
> 0 and @⇡S@✓A > 0 for the non-tradable sector.
Intuitively, Prediction 3 follows from the fact that a positive shock to productivity
in the agricultural sector has two eﬀects on local firms. On the one hand, it induces an
increase in the cost of labor because increased demand for labor in agriculture causes
the equilibrium wage to raise. On the other hand, the productivity shock positively
aﬀects local incomes and thus potentially the demand that firms face. For firms that
produce locally but sell outside the district (tradable firms), demand is exogenous to local
conditions, so only the first eﬀect applies. It follows that a positive shock to agricultural
productivity means lower profits, and thus reduced employment and production. For firms
producing and selling locally (non-tradable firms), instead, a positive shock to agriculture
implies an increase in the cost of labor but also an increase in demand (and thus price).
The prediction illustrates how, under the model assumptions, the latter eﬀect dominates,
and so non-tradable production, employment and profits increase.
Prediction 4. A positive shock to agricultural productivity ✓A increases local income,
I, and local consumption of all goods: @I@✓A > 0 and
@cj
@✓A
> 0 for j 2 {A,M, S}.
The increase in income follows from the fact that I = ⇡A+⇡S+w and all its components
are increasing in agricultural productivity. The increase in consumption of agricultural
and traded goods is a direct consequence of the fact that income increases and prices
of these goods are exogenous to local conditions. The increase in consumption of non-
traded goods is a result of the fact that price pS increases more than wage w. Further,
this prediction is equivalent to @yS@✓A > 0 because in equilibrium cS = YS.
2.2 The Introduction of a Rural Workfare Program
NREGA entitles every household in rural India to 100 days of public work per year at a
state-level minimum wage. I introduce NREGA in the model as an employer that posts
jobs at a fixed wage wN .
Prediction 5. The availability of NREGA jobs induces a wage floor. That is, w   wN
for any ✓A.
After NREGA is introduced, the local equilibrium wage cannot fall below the NREGA
wage wN . This is the case even when agricultural productivity realizations are very
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low. The introduction of NREGA induces a threshold ✓¯NA such that the pre-NREGA
equilibrium wage emerges for any ✓A > ✓¯NA , while the equilibrium wage is equal to the
NREGA wage wN for any ✓A  ✓¯NA 8. This happens because for no agent it can be optimal
to work for a wage lower than wN when a NREGA job, which pays wN , is available. This
implies that if other employers in the local economy want to hire workers, they must pay
at least the NREGA wage.
I am assuming here that NREGA labor demand at wN is infinite, while we know that
the implementation of NREGA limits employment to a maximum of 100 days. This is
done to simplify the comparative statics. The key result that NREGA induces an increase
in equilibrium wage for certain agricultural productivity realizations would still remain
if I assumed that NREGA oﬀered jobs up to a maximum amount nN . This alternative
assumption would not deliver the wage floor prediction, but would still deliver a wage
increase prediction, which is what matters for the results below.
Prediction 6. NREGA acts as a counter-cyclical stimulus policy. That is, the share of
agents working for NREGA is decreasing in ✓A: @nN@✓A < 0.
Before the introduction of NREGA, the labor market clears through the equilibrium
wage. After the introduction of NREGA, since the wage level is fixed at wN , the labor
market clears through the number of agents working for NREGA, nN . That is, the new
market clearing condition is given by:
nN + nA(w
N) + nM(w
N) + nS(w
N) = 1.
Now notice that, after the introduction of NREGA, labor demand in the tradable
sector does not depend on ✓A (this happens because ✓A does not aﬀect the equilibrium
wage anymore, and so has no impact on the cost of labor that tradable firms face).
Labor demand in the agricultural and non-tradable sector, instead, still positively depends
on ✓A. It follows that labor market clearing requires NREGA employment to increase
when agricultural productivity in the local economy is low. Prediction 7 implies that,
empirically, we should observe NREGA take-up to increase during “bad times”.
These considerations lead to Prediction 7, which illustrates the key implications of
NREGA for the volatility that the local economy faces. Let ✏y,✓A indicate the elasticity of
8For simplicity, I work below under the assumption that all agricultural productivity realizations are
below the threshold ✓¯NA . The full characterization would take into consideration the fact that, for good
productivity realizations, the post-NREGA equilibrium is equivalent to the pre-NREGA equilibrium.
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y with respect to ✓A before the introduction of NREGA, and let ✏Ny,✓A indicate the same
elasticity after the introduction of NREGA.
Prediction 7. NREGA acts as a local stabilizer. Specifically, NREGA:
• Attenuates local wage elasticity: ✏Nw,✓A < ✏w,✓A
• Attenuates local income and consumption elasticity: ✏NI,✓A < ✏I,✓A and ✏Ncj ,✓A < ✏cj✓A
for j 2 {A,M, S}.
• Attenuates the counter-cyclical reallocation to the local non-farm tradable sector:
| ✏NnM ,✓A |<| ✏nM ,✓A |
• Attenuates the pro-cyclical reallocation to the local non-farm non-tradable sector:
✏NnS ,✓A < ✏nS ,✓A
Because of its stabilization eﬀect on local wage, NREGA has an impact on local indus-
trial volatility, and attenuates the short-term fluctuations in employment and production
in the non-farm sector. Consider firms selling tradable goods first. When a negative
shock hits the economy, NREGA prevents the wage to fall and thus prevents a reduction
in the cost of labor that these firms face. As a consequence, these firms will increase
their production and employment by less than they did pre-NREGA. Consider now firms
selling non-tradable goods. When a negative shock hits the economy, NREGA, by pre-
venting a wage decrease, also prevents a decrease in local incomes and thus in the demand
that these firms face. Prediction 7 states that, given the model assumptions, the demand
eﬀect prevails and so non-tradable firms will decrease their production and employment
by less than they did pre-NREGA. In sum, NREGA attenuates the volatility in local firm
production and employment.
While I focus here on the implications of NREGA for local volatility, NREGA has
eﬀects on the level of local economic activity as well. In particular, NREGA also causes
an increase in the wage level. This translates into an increase in the cost of labor and hence
a reduction in profits for firms in the tradable sector. In turn, the reduction in profits
will cause tradable firms to shrink. On the other hand, because of its positive eﬀects on
local demand, NREGA may induce higher production of firms in the non-tradable sector,
thus fostering the development of the local non-farm non-tradable sector. The empirical
analysis also examines these additional eﬀects.
12
3 Data
This paper combines data from a large number of sources to provide a full picture of
the eﬀects of agricultural productivity on the local economy and to assess the impact of
NREGA on local economic activity. It relies on a unique combination of district-level
measures and micro-data for both firms and households.
3.1 Firm Data
The key dataset for firms is the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), collected by the
Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation (MoSPI), Government of India. The
ASI includes all registered manufacturing plants in India with more than fifty workers
(one hundred if they operate without power) and a random one-third sample of registered
plants with more than ten workers (twenty if without power). Sampling weights are
provided so that the weighted sample reflects the population. I use sampling weights
throughout the empirical analysis.
The ASI has extremely rich information on plant characteristics over the fiscal year
(April of a given year through March of the following year) for around 50,000 plants
each year. It collects information in balance-sheet format for a large number variables
of interest (e.g. profits, output, number of employees, capital) so that it is possible to
analyze how firms respond to agricultural productivity across multiple dimensions.
This paper uses 10 waves of data, spanning the fiscal years 2000-2001 to 2009-20109.
This sample includes years before the introduction of NREGA, to estimate the relevant
elasticity in the absence of the policy, and years after the policy, to test whether NREGA
caused a reduction in volatility. Importantly, the availability of yearly data allows me to
analyze the exact timing of change in elasticities, and thus to verify that it tracks closely
the timing of the implementation of NREGA across districts.
The key outcome variables considered are measures of production and employment.
Production is measured using the value of total output. For employment, I use the total
number of workers and total number of man-days employed. In some of the specifications,
I distinguish blue-collar and white-collar workers, as well as permanent and contract
workers. I also consider measures of profitability (gross value added and profits) and
capital (total value of fixed capital). Finally, I construct a measure of daily wage dividing
9Additional waves are available after 2009-2010, but 2009-2010 is the last wave in which information
on firm location at district-level is disclosed. In subsequent waves, location information is only available
at the state-level. With no district information, it is not possible to match firm data to district measures.
It is thus not possible to include later waves in the current analysis.
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total compensation paid to workers by the number of man-days.
The ASI data collect information on industry up to 4-digit of the Indian National
Industrial Classification (NIC). Industry classifications changed across the time span con-
sidered (from NIC 1998, to NIC 2004, to NIC 2008). I develop and apply a concordance
across industrial classifications to be able to group firms into industries in a consistent
way across years.
As illustrated in the model, agricultural productivity shocks have diﬀerent eﬀects
on firms depending on the the type of goods they produce (traded vs. non-traded). I
therefore require a criterion to classify firms according to the tradability of their products.
I classify industries as tradable or non-tradable using three diﬀerent definitions.
The first definition relies on a measure of industry tradability derived from the United
States Census Commodity Flow Survey (CFS) in Holmes and Stevens (2014). Using the
CFS, Holmes and Stevens (2014) calculate a measure of transportation costs for each
4-digit SIC industry which is closely correlated with average product shipment distance.
According to this classification, industries that produce goods such as ice-creams, newspa-
pers, bricks and cardboard boxes are among the least tradable, while those that produce
watches, x-ray equipment and aircraft parts are the most tradable. I match U.S. 4-digit
SIC codes to India 4-digit NIC codes and define an industry as tradable if the eta pa-
rameter in Holmens and Steven (2014) is less than 0.47. By this definition, 33 percent
of the 4-digit manufacturing industries are tradable. Table 4 reports the list of 2-digit
industries and, for each industry, indicates the share of industry output that is classified
as tradable.
The second and third definitions of tradability rely on Kothari (2014), which in turn
builds on the classifications of tradable industries used in Mian and Sufi (2014). Kothari
(2014) constructs two measures of tradability at the 3-digit NIC level. The first is based
on a measure of geographical concentration of industrial production across counties in the
United States. Industries whose production is highly concentrated in a few counties in
the U.S. are considered to be tradable, while industries that have production spread over
lots of counties are considered non-tradable. I apply this measure of industry tradability
based on U.S. levels of concentration to India. The second measure in Kothari (2014)
is based on the degree of international trade carried out in any Indian industry as a
share of domestic production. Industries in which international trade is a large percent
of domestic production are considered to be more tradable. These definitions distinguish
industries that are below/above median tradability, and hence classify 50 percent of the
3-digit manufacturing industries are tradable.
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I also derive a classification of industry linkages to the agricultural sector. I classify
4-digit NIC industries as upstream or downstream of agriculture using the India MOSPI
Input-Output tables for 2004-2005. For each industry, I calculate the agriculture output
share, that is, the share of industry output that is purchased by the agricultural sector.
I define an industry as “upstream” of agriculture if this upstream linkage share is larger
than 3 percent. I then calculate the industry agriculture input cost share, that is, the
share of industry input that is purchased from the agricultural sector. An industry is
“downstream” if the agriculture input cost share is larger than 20 percent. I refer to an
industry as “non-linked” if it is neither upstream nor downstream. By this definition, 2
percent of firms in the ASI data are upstream and 17 percent are downstream. The most-
linked upstream industries include those that produce fertilizers, pesticides and other
agrochemical products, while the most-linked downstream industries include many that
process agricultural output and manufacture food.
Using ASI 2000-2001, I also define a measure of capital intensity. For each firm, I
compute the ratio between fixed assets and total compensation paid to employees. I then
compute an average of this measure at the industry level and define an industry as capital
intensive if the industry measure if above the median across industries.
Finally, I define a measure of industry dependence on external finance. I compute
the ratio between outstanding loans and fixed assets. This is in the spirit of Rajan and
Zingales (1998). A higher ratio indicates that a higher share of capital is financed through
external funds. I define an industry as highly dependent on external finance if the industry
average is above the median across industries.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for all firms in the ASI data. Tables 2 and 3 provide
summary statistics distinguishing firms by industry type (tradable vs. non-tradable) and
by NREGA-implementation-phase.
3.2 Consumption Data
Consumption expenditure measures come from the National Sample Survey (NSS) Con-
sumer Expenditure Survey (Schedule 1). I use 7 waves spanning the years 2003-2004 to
2011-2012. Specifically, the analysis includes the NSS waves 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66 and 68.
The survey includes extremely detailed information on consumption expenditure, col-
lecting information on more than 400 consumption items. In the empirical analysis, I
focus on monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE). This is computed as total monthly
expenditure divided by household size. I consider both total MPCE and MPCE in diﬀer-
ent consumption categories. In particular, I group items into the three categories of food
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consumption, manufactured goods consumption, and services consumption.
I define real consumption dividing nominal consumption by the state Consumer Price
Index for Agricultural Labourers, published by the Government of India.
3.3 Wages and Employment Data
Wage and employment data are from the NSS Employment and Unemployment Survey
(Schedule 10). The data include 6 waves spanning the years 2003-2004 to 2011-2012.
Specifically, the analysis includes the NSS waves 60, 61, 62, 64, 66 and 68.
The NSS asks individuals who worked for a wage their total earnings in the 7 days
preceding the survey. I construct a measure of daily wage dividing total earnings by
the number of days worked. The NSS survey provides information on the industry in
which the individual works, so I can define an overall district wage, and, separately, an
agricultural and a non-agricultural district wage. The survey also allows to distinguish
workers in regular or casual wage work. The survey covers a rich set of demographic
characteristics, including age, gender, education and landholdings. This allows to include
in the wage and employment specifications worker-level controls. This guarantees that
the estimates capture actual impacts of agricultural shocks and not just changes in the
composition of workers.
The NSS collects information on employment in the 7 days before the survey. I
compute the number of days that an individual spends in the labor force, unemployed or
working in diﬀerent sectors.
3.4 Agricultural Data
I use data on annual district level agricultural production collected and published by the
Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture. This data is reported
at the financial year level, which ranges from April to March in the subsequent calendar
year. For every district, I only consider crops that have been consistently planted on at
least 1,000 hectares during all the years in which the data are available. The resulting
dataset is an unbalanced panel dataset covering the period from 2000-2010.
For a given crop, the yield is computed as total production divided by area cultivated. I
construct a yearly measure of district agricultural yield computing the weighted average of
the yields of the diﬀerent crops consistently cultivated in the district, with area cultivated
under a given crop used as weight.
Additional agricultural data, such as district-level measures of total area cropped and
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area irrigated, are from the Land Use Statistics Information System, Indian Ministry of
Agriculture.
3.5 Rainfall Data
This paper uses data from the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM), developed
by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Japan Aerospace
and Exploration Agency (JAXA). The TRMM provides gridded rainfall rates at very high
spatial and temporal resolution. Daily rainfall measures are available at the 0.25 by 0.25
degree grid-cell size, and are converted into overall monthly rainfall measures. Rainfall
in a given district-year refers to rainfall registered on the grid point closest to the district
centroid. For the empirical analysis, I focus on total monsoon rainfall, which I define as
total rainfall in the months of June, July, August and September. In the Indian context,
monsoon rainfall accounts for at least 70% of annual rainfall.
I also define a categorical variable aimed at capturing possible non-linearities in the
eﬀects of rainfall. The variable Rainfall Shock equals one if monsoon rainfall is greater
than the district’s eightieth percentile of monsoon rainfall, zero if between the twentieth
and eightieth percentiles, and minus one if below the twentieth percentile. This is the same
measure used in Jayachandran (2006). I also show that results are robust to a continuos
measure of rainfall deviation from its average, and compute the yearly fractional deviation
from the long-run district’s mean monsoon rainfall.
3.6 NREGA Data
Data on participation to NREGA come from the NSS Employment and Unemployment
Survey, waves 64, 66 and 68. I compute the number of days in the reference week that an
individual spends working under NREGA. Participation figures from household surveys
are likely more reliable than participation figures available from administrative sources,
and so are preferred to those.
The NSS Survey also asks information on the total earnings received from wage work
under NREGA. Dividing total earnings by the number of days worked, I obtain a mea-
sure of the NREGA wage that a worker receives. These wages are used to compute the
district average wage paid under NREGA in a given year. These wages are then com-
pared to the state-specific NREGA statutory wages, which vary over time. To make the
comparison possible, I complied information on NREGA statutory wages using multiple
administrative sources, including the notifications of NREGA wage revisions available in
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the Gazette of India. Figures 6 and 7 provide an illustration of the cross-section and over
time variation in the NREGA statutory wage and its relation to the actual wage being
paid under the program.
4 Background
The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme was introduced in India in 2005
through the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act. The Act entitles every rural
household to 100 days of public-sector work a year at a minimum wage established at
the state-level. According to government administrative data, in 2010-2011 the NREGA
provided 2.27 billion person-days of employment to 53 million households, with a budget
that represents 0.6% of Indian GDP. The size of the program makes it one of the largest
and most ambitious public-works employment schemes ever attempted worldwide.
The type of work generated by the program is low-wage, casual, unskilled manual
work, often in construction and for projects in transport infrastructure, irrigation or
water conservation. Employment creation and poverty reduction are at the core of the
program, and this is apparent in a number of the Act provisions, including those that
govern project costs. The Act limits material, capital and skilled wages expenditures to
40% of total expenditures, thus reserving the remaining 60% to expenditure on unskilled
wages. The Act also establishes that the central government bears the entire cost of
unskilled manual workers, but only 75% of the cost of material, capital and skilled workers,
with the state government responsible for the remaining 25%. This creates an incentive
for states to select projects that are intensive in unskilled-labor and is meant to induce
large employment creation per unit of budget.
Participation in NREGA does not entail formal requirements, and any individual can
participate to the program as long as he resides in rural areas and is willing to earn at
the minimum wage and performing manual work. NREGA hence relies on self-selection
of individuals into the workfare program. Both women and men can participate to the
program, and the Act in fact explicitly states that female workforce must be involved in at
least one third of the work created, and that men and women must receive the same wage.
The importance of these provisions from a gender perspective and their implications on
women empowerment and female labor force participation have been the object of some
of the studies that have documented the introduction of NREGA (Afridi et al., 2012;
Azam, 2012; Dreze and Khera, 2009).
Households can apply for work at any time of the year. The application process as
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established in the Act entails a few steps. Households first apply for a job card which is
issued by the local Gram Panchayat. Once in posses of the job card, households can submit
an application to the Gram Panchayat, stating the time and duration for which they seek
employment. The Act mandates that, following such a request, employment on a public-
works project is to be provided within 15 days of the application. If this statutory 15 day
deadline is exceeded, the household is entitled to a daily unemployment allowance. The
program was therefore designed to be demand-driven and highly responsive to the needs
of rural households, though some studies and field reports have documented substantial
variation in the implementation standards across states and districts (Dreze and Khera,
2009; Dutta et al., 2012; Niehaus and Sukhtankar, 2012 and 2013; Papp, 2012; Sharma,
2009; World Bank, 2011).
NREGA was rolled out in rural India in three phases, between 2006 and 2008. The
first phase started in the first quarter of 2006, when the program was implemented in 200
districts. In 2007, 130 further districts were added. In 2008, the third phase included
the remaining districts into the scheme. NREGA currently covers all Indian districts
except a few entirely urban centers. Districts that received NREGA in the earlier phases
were selected to have lower agricultural wages and lower agricultural output per worker,
though this criterion was combined with the objective of starting the program in all
states. This caused a number of districts in richer states to receive the program early. As
a consequence, some early phases districts in richer states were in fact significantly better
across a number of economic indicators than late phase districts in poorer states.
5 Empirical Strategy
The empirical analysis uses the predictions derived in Section 2 to study the eﬀects of
agricultural productivity fluctuations on the local economy and to test whether NREGA
had an impact on how such fluctuations get transmitted through the local economy.
Hence, it has two parts.
In the first part, I study the relationships between farm and non-farm sector for the
years before NREGA is introduced. In the second part, I show how the introduction of
NREGA changes the way in which the local economy responds to shocks.
The first part exploits exogenous variation in agricultural productivity due to monsoon
rainfall realizations across districts and over time to estimate the elasticity of equilibrium
outcomes with respect to rainfall. The second part takes advantage of the timing in
NREGA implementation to test for a change in the elasticities as predicted by the model.
19
5.1 The Eﬀect of Agricultural Productivity on the Local Non-
Farm Sector
I estimate the relationship between rainfall and local outcomes using the time period
prior to the introduction of NREGA. This guarantees that the estimates are not aﬀected
by any impact that NREGA may have. To establish the impact of rainfall on the local
economy, I provide evidence for each channel of the transmission mechanism. First, I test
the key idea that rainfall aﬀects agricultural productivity, by providing estimates of the
elasticity of district crop yield to rainfall. Then, I estimate the impact of NREGA on (i)
local wages, (ii) local consumption, (iii) local firm production and employment.
First, I analyze the eﬀect of rainfall on district crop yields. I focus on monsoon rainfall
(June to September) since this is the most important for India’s agricultural productivity.
I estimate the following equation:
log(ydpt) =  log(Rdpt) +  d + ⌧pt + "dpt (5)
where d stands for district; p stands for NREGA implementation-phase, ranging from
1 to 3; and t indicates time. The regression includes two sets of fixed eﬀects. First,
district fixed eﬀects, which capture any time-invariant district characteristics that aﬀects
the level of agricultural productivity. The second are time fixed eﬀects. The time fixed
eﬀects are NREGA-implementation-phase specific, and thus remove yearly shocks that
are common to the districts which received NREGA in phases 1, 2 or 310.
The coeﬃcient of interest is  . The prediction is that monsoon rainfall strongly aﬀects
agricultural production. I expect this to be the case since in India more than 50% of
agriculture is rainfed and so highly dependent on the monsoon realization for irrigation.
In this and all regressions below, standard errors are clustered at the district level to
capture serial correlation. Results are virtually unaﬀected if instead I cluster standard
errors at the region-year level to allow for spatial correlation.
Second, I establish the impact of monsoon rainfall on wages through the regression:
log(widpt) =  log(Rdpt) + ⇢Xidpt +  d + ⌧pt + "idpt (6)
where i indexes an individual. Fixed eﬀects are as above. The regression includes
worker’s demographic characteristics, Xidpt, to tackle the possibility that composition
10I could alternatively introduce time fixed eﬀects common across districts, and indeed results are
unchanged in such case. NREGA-implementation-phase specific fixed eﬀects are introduced mainly to
keep the pre-NREGA specifications consistent with the specifications that estimate the impact of NREGA.
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changes. For robustness, I also estimate specifications that add state-specific time trends,
or trends on initial district conditions (that is, time trends interacted with time-invariant
district characteristics such as poverty rate), to allow wages to trend diﬀerently across dif-
ferent districts. I run the regression on all wages, as well as separately for high-skilled/low-
skilled and agricultural/non-agricultural workers.
Third, I estimate the elasticity of local consumption. The specification is the same as
the one used for wage elasticity, except that the unit of observation is a household rather
than a worker. I estimate the elasticity of monthly per capita expenditure using both
total consumption and diﬀerent consumption components (specifically, food consumption,
manufactured goods consumption and services consumption).
Fourth, I analyze the impact on rainfall on firm outcomes. The estimating equation
is:
log(yjdpt) =  log(Rdpt) +  d + ⌧pt + #pj + ⇢jt + "jdst (7)
which studies outcome y for firms in industry j operating in district d of NREGA
implementation-phase p at time t.
District and time fixed eﬀects are as in the specifications above. NREGA-implementation-
phase specific industry fixed eﬀects are included to capture time-invariant industry char-
acteristics that are common within a NREGA implementation phase. I also include
industry-specific time fixed eﬀects to allow industries to grow at diﬀerent rates over time.
The coeﬃcient of interest is  . The main hypothesis is that, before the introduction
of NREGA, there was a significant link between monsoon rainfall and manufacturing
production and employment.
The model in Section 2 illustrates how we should expect the impact of rainfall to diﬀer
depending on whether a firm produces traded or non-traded goods. To capture this, I
estimate the regression separately for tradable and non-tradable sectors using a dummy
Tj that captures tradability of a given industry. For robustness, I use multiple tradability
definitions. The data section reports information on how these dummies are constructed.
5.2 The Introduction of a Rural Workfare Program
The second part of the empirical analysis tests whether the introduction of NREGA
caused an attenuation of the relationships above. This is done using the empirical setup
presented above and adding an interaction term to those specifications. That is, I include
the interaction between rainfall and an indicator Ndpt which is equal to 1 if district d in
implementation phase p has NREGA at time t.
21
The identifying assumption in this part is that the timing of the implementation
of NREGA across-districts is not correlated with any omitted variable that may also
attenuate the rainfall-dependence of the local economy. It is important to note that this
identifying assumption does not require the timing to be uncorrelated with trends in the
outcome variables of interest. Indeed, the inclusion in the specification of time fixed
eﬀects that are specific to each NREGA implementation phase implies that identification
is coming oﬀ of districts within the same implementation phase. That is, the specification
flexibly allows for the possibility that diﬀerent implementation phases are on diﬀerent
trends.
In this part, I first show that NREGA has the potential to attenuate local volatility
because NREGA jobs provision increases when the local economy is hit by a negative
agricultural productivity shock. I then proceed by studying the moderating eﬀect of
NREGA on local outcomes following the same order of the specifications above.
First, I provide evidence that NREGA take-up responds to rainfall using the regression:
log(yidpt) =  log(Rdpt) +  log(Rdpt)⇥Ndpt + ⇢Xidpt +  d + ⌧pt + "idpt (8)
where y represents the time that individual i spends working in public works. Other
indexes are as in the specifications above. The prediction is that   = 0 and   < 0. That
is, before the introduction of NREGA, there was no relation between public employment
and rainfall. Once NREGA is introduced, individuals respond to a negative productivity
shock resorting to NREGA jobs, and do so to a larger extent the worse is the shock.
Second, I show that, at least in the time period considered, NREGA did not attenuate
the relationship between rainfall and agricultural yields. It is possible that in the long-run
NREGA makes agricultural yields less sensitive to rainfall, for instance through an impact
on irrigation infrastructure. However, I show that this does not seem to be happening in
the years right after its introduction. This means that any attenuation in the response
of a given variable to rainfall (the reduced form) can be interpreted as the result of an
attenuation in the response of such variable to agricultural yields (the second stage), rather
than an attenuation in the response of agricultural yields to rainfall (the first stage).
Third, I show the moderating impact of NREGA on wage elasticity. The specification
for wage elasticity becomes as follows:
log(widpt) =  log(Rdpt) +  log(Rdpt)⇥Ndpt + ⇢Xidpt +  d + ⌧pt + "idpt (9)
Notice that the treatment dummy Ndpt is collinear to the NREGA-implementation-
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phase-specific time fixed eﬀects. Hence, the specification does not estimate the impact
that NREGA has on the level of the outcome variable. It instead tests whether the way
in which rainfall translates into local wages changes with the availability of NREGA jobs.
The prediction is that   > 0 and   < 0, that is, NREGA reduces local wage volatility.
The same specification is used to assess the eﬀect of the introduction of NREGA on
consumption volatility.
Finally, I test whether NREGA had a moderating impact on local industrial production
and employment. The specification for firm outcomes becomes:
log(yjdpt) =  log(Rdpt) +  log(Rdpt)⇥Ndpt +  d + ⌧pt + #pj + ⇢jt + "jdst (10)
One concern with the specifications above is that the NREGA treatment may be cap-
turing a more general over-time decline in the rainfall-dependence of the local economy,
or the impact of other contemporaneous policies that aﬀect rainfall-dependence. I tackle
this possibility by estimating, for each of the outcomes above, a yearly measure of elastic-
ity. This allows me to track elasticities throughout the study time period and show that
the timing of the elasticity attenuation coincides with the introduction of NREGA across
the three implementation phases. Specifically, I estimate a regression that includes the
term
P
s2{ 7, 6,...,2,3}  slog(Rds). The aim is to plot the estimated coeﬃcients  s together
with their confidence intervals, and show that the pattern is such that the  s are mostly
constant in the period before NREGA, jump in correspondence of the introduction of
NREGA and stabilize at the new level in the subsequent years.
6 Results
The results, as the empirical strategy, comprise two parts. In the first part, I estimate the
relationships between rainfall and local outcomes in the period before the introduction
of NREGA. In the second part, I present the results that consider the entire period and
show how the introduction of NREGA aﬀects such relationships.
6.1 The Eﬀect of Agricultural Productivity on the Local Non-
Farm Sector
I start by establishing that monsoon rainfall has an impact on agricultural productivity
in the time period considered in this study. Table 5 shows that monsoon rainfall has a
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large eﬀect on district crop yields, and illustrates how the eﬀect changes with the share
of cultivated land that is irrigated.
I then estimate the impact of monsoon rainfall on local wages. Table 6 reports the
results. Consistently with the hypothesis of local labor mobility across sectors, the esti-
mates show that rainfall aﬀects not only the wage in the agricultural sector but also the
wage in the non-agricultural sector.
Table 7 presents the estimates of consumption elasticity. The consumption regressions
test the prediction that rainfall is an important driver of demand in the local economy.
The results show that there is a strong relationship between rainfall and monthly per
capita expenditure. Columns (2) and (3) distinguish food and non-food consumption.
They show that the impact is weakest on food consumption and strongest on non-food.
Column (4) reports the elasticity for consumption expenditure on manufactured goods.
This is the estimate most closely related to the eﬀect that a rainfall shock has on the
demand for the goods that manufacturing firms produce.
Estimates of the response of local firms to agricultural fluctuations are presented in
Table 8. Consistently with the evidence in Table 6, Column (4) shows that a positive
rainfall realization raises the cost of labor for local manufacturing firms. However, even
though they face higher labor costs, firms respond pro-cyclically to shocks to agricultural
productivity. The estimates of production and employment elasticities in Columns (1) to
(3) are indeed positive. The results suggest that the (positive) local demand eﬀect more
than compensate the (negative) local wage eﬀect that results from a positive realization
of monsoon rainfall.
Evidence in support of the demand channel is presented in Table 9. The table reports
the results from regressions that consider separately firms in tradable and non-tradable
industries. The estimates show that pro-cyclicality is driven by firms that produce non-
tradable goods. For firms that produce tradable goods, instead, the estimated elasticities
are negative, even though not significant. These estimates are consistent with the model
prediction of opposite eﬀects on firms that sell traded vs. non-traded goods.
6.2 The Introduction of a Rural Workfare Program
In this part I test the hypothesis that the introduction of NREGA led to a moderation of
the relationships between rainfall and local outcomes.
The stabilization potential of NREGA rests on the fact that NREGA jobs provision
increases when the local economy is hit by a negative agricultural productivity shock. I
therefore test whether local participation to NREGA increases when there is a negative
24
rainfall realization. Results are reported in Column (2) of Table 10. The estimates confirm
that, pre-NREGA, participation in public employment was not linked to rainfall. Once
NREGA is introduced, instead, take-up of public works jobs is significantly (negatively)
correlated to rainfall.
Column (1) of Table 10 shows that, in the time period considered, NREGA did not
attenuate the relationship between rainfall and agricultural yields. This means that any
attenuation in the response of a given variable to rainfall (the reduced form) can be
interpreted as the result of the attenuation in the response of such variable to agricultural
yields (the second stage), rather than an attenuation in the response of agricultural yields
to rainfall (the first stage).
Table 11 tests the prediction that the introduction of NREGA attenuated local wage
volatility. The results support the hypothesis that NREGA stabilized the wage, and in
fact suggest that NREGA brought the wage elasticity to zero.
That NREGA has a moderation eﬀect on local volatility also emerges from Table 12,
that reports the results for local consumption. The introduction of NREGA attenuated
the relationship between rainfall and consumption. This means that NREGA is able to
support local demand when agricultural productivity, and therefore incomes, are low.
Table 13 and 14 test the hypothesis that NREGA aﬀects the way in which local firms
respond to agricultural fluctuations. Results are reported separately for the diﬀerent
NREGA implementation phases, since they diﬀer in their pre-NREGA volatility, and, as
a consequence, in the potential attenuation post-NREGA. The results are consistent with
the hypothesis that NREGA attenuated the pro-cyclical response of non-tradable firms in
Phase 1 and 2 districts. Post-NREGA, production and employment fluctuate to a lesser
extent in response to agricultural fluctuations.
6.3 Robustness Checks
In this section I perform a number of robustness checks to show that the estimates are
robust to deviations from the baseline framework.
First, I show the robustness of the results to alternative ways of measuring the weather
shock. Table 15 reports the results of estimating firm elasticities using a measure of rainfall
shock instead of total rainfall. The variable Rainfall Shock equals one if monsoon rainfall
is greater than the district’s eightieth percentile of monsoon rainfall, zero if between the
twentieth and eightieth percentiles, and minus one if below the twentieth percentile. This
is the same measure used in Jayachandran (2006). I also define the variable Rainfall
Deviation which is equal to the yearly fractional deviation from the long-run district’s
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mean monsoon rainfall. The results obtained using these measures are very similar to the
baseline results and are statistically significant.
Second, I show that the heterogenous impact across tradable and non-tradable in-
dustries is robust to alternative tradability classifications. Panel A in Table 16 reports
the estimates of firm elasticities separately for tradable and non-tradable industries using
the classification based on geographical concentration. Panel B reports the elasticities
estimated using the classification based on international trade. The results confirm that
the pro-cyclical response in driven by firms in non-tradable industries.
In a third set of robustness checks, I tackle the possibility that yearly fluctuations in
rainfall could potentially have an impact on the non-agricultural sector through channels
other than agricultural productivity. I show results from two placebo tests. First, I ex-
ploit the fact that there is large variation across districts in access to irrigation sources.
I identify poorly irrigated districts (those for which less than 20% of cultivated land is
irrigated) and highly irrigated districts (those for which more than 60% of cultivated land
is irrigated). Each group accounts for around 30% of Indian districts. Access to irriga-
tion makes agriculture less susceptible to weather variation and hence we would expect
crop yields in highly irrigated districts to be aﬀected by monsoon rainfall very limitedly.
Column 1 and 2 in Table 17 show that the first-stage eﬀect of rainfall on agricultural pro-
ductivity is strong only in districts with poor access to irrigation. Additionally, Columns
3 to 10 show that the reduced-form eﬀect of rainfall on firm outcomes only exists in
these same districts. The elasticities of firm wage, production and employment in highly
irrigated districts are much smaller and not statistically significant. This lack of both
first-stage and reduced-form eﬀects in highly irrigated districts suggests that the eﬀect of
growing-season rainfall on firms operates through the key channel of agricultural produc-
tivity.
The second placebo check tests whether rainfall outside the main growing season has
an eﬀect on firms. The key idea is that rainfall outside the monsoon season should not be
a strong determinant of agricultural productivity and hence should not have an impact
on industrial outcomes. The results are presented in Table 18. Column 1 shows that
non-monsoon rainfall has a very limited impact on district crop yields. Consistently with
agricultural productivity being the key channel through which monsoon rainfall aﬀects
firms, Column 2 to 5 show that the elasticities of firm outcomes to non-monsoon rainfall
are small in magnitude and not statistically significant.
The fourth robustness check assesses whether the findings reflect the strength of an-
other channel through which agricultural productivity can aﬀect the manufacturing sector:
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input-output linkages. Farming requires inputs produced by other sectors, including man-
ufacturing. This means that an increase in agricultural productivity in a given district
might increase the demand for industries that produce inputs used in agriculture, such as
chemicals or fertilizers. To the extent that manufacturing firms producing chemicals and
fertilizers face high transport costs, their production and employment would respond to
local demand conditions. Therefore, the eﬀect of rainfall that I show could potentially be
explained by an increase in the agricultural demand for manufacturing inputs. A similar
argument applies to manufacturing industries that use agricultural goods as intermediate
inputs – for instance, industries that process food. In order to assess the contribution of
these direct linkages on my estimates, I use the Indian Input-Output table (2004-2005)
to identify industries directly linked to agriculture through input-output linkages, either
upstream or downstream. I then use this information to define non-linked industries and
estimate elasticities for this subset. Table 19 reports the results from regressions that con-
sider separately firms that are linked and non-linked to the agricultural sector, and, for the
latter, shows results separately for firms in tradable and non-tradable industries. Column
(1) reports the elasticity estimates for firms that are linked to agriculture. The estimates
are indeed larger than for the overall sample. However, Columns (2) to (4) show that
rainfall has a positive impact also on firms in non-linked non-tradable industries. Taken
together, these results imply that the pro-cyclical response of the manufacturing sector is
not fully driven by the processing of agricultural output in downstream industries or by
larger agricultural sector demand for upstream industries.
Fifth, Table 20 shows that the results remain statistically significant when I correct
standard errors to account for spatial correlation by clustering at the region-year level.
Finally, I provide evidence for the robustness of the results on the stabilization impact
of NREGA. One concern with the baseline specification is that the NREGA treatment
may be capturing a more general over-time decline in the rainfall-dependence of the local
economy, or the impact of other contemporaneous policies that aﬀect rainfall-dependence.
I tackle this possibility by estimating yearly measures of elasticity. This allows me to track
elasticities throughout the study time period and show that the timing of the change in
elasticity coincides with the introduction of NREGA. Figures (1) to (3) plot the estimated
elasticities together with the confidence interval. The coeﬃcient patterns show that elas-
ticities are relatively constant in the period before NREGA, and move to a diﬀerent level
in correspondence of the introduction of NREGA, thus reassuring against the hypothesis
that NREGA is capturing the attenuation eﬀect of other omitted variables.
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7 Conclusion
How do agricultural productivity shocks propagate through the local economy and aﬀect
manufacturing firms? I present a simple model of a small open economy to illustrate how
shocks to the farm-sector are transmitted to local firms through linkages in the labor and
goods market. Using variation in weather realizations across districts and over time, I
estimate the response of local firms’ production and employment to agricultural produc-
tivity shocks, and show that firms respond pro-cyclically. The evidence best supports a
local demand story: the higher incomes resulting from agriculture translate into higher
demand for local non-tradable firms. The results highlight the importance of the mobility
of goods for local volatility, and illustrate how local rural incomes continue to play an
important role in determining the economic opportunities of manufacturing firms.
The paper additionally examines whether the introduction of a rural workfare pro-
gram, the NREGA, aﬀects the response of the local economy to agricultural volatility.
It shows that the program acts as a stabilization policy and attenuates the pro-cyclical
response of local wage, consumption, and firms’ outcomes to agricultural productivity
shocks. The evidence from NREGA exemplifies how policies not targeted to firms can
still exert sizable influence on firms’ decisions because of their impact on the economy in
which both firms and farms operate. Attention in the past has focused only on policies
that aﬀect firms directly. This paper instead highlights how attention should also be
paid to policies that target rural households and the agricultural sector, as these have
far-reaching consequences.
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Figure 1: NREGA Phase 1 and 2 – Non-Tradable Output Elasticity Over Time
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Notes: The vertical red line indicates the date of introduction of NREGA. The black
line reports the estimated elasticity of manufacturing output with respect to monsoon
rainfall for each year before and after the introduction of NREGA. The dotted black
lines indicate the 90% confidence intervals. The red dashed lines report the coeﬃcients
obtained from the interaction of monsoon rainfall with the NREGA treatment dummy.
Sample is restricted to NREGA-implementation Phases 1 and 2.
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Figure 2: NREGA Phase 1 and 2 – Non-Tradable Employment Elasticity Over Time
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Notes: The vertical red line indicates the date of introduction of NREGA. The black line
reports the estimated elasticity of manufacturing employment with respect to monsoon
rainfall for each year before and after the introduction of NREGA. The dotted black
lines indicate the 90% confidence intervals. The red dashed lines report the coeﬃcients
obtained from the interaction of monsoon rainfall with the NREGA treatment dummy.
Sample is restricted to NREGA-implementation Phases 1 and 2.
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Figure 3: NREGA Phase 1 and 2 – Wage Elasticity Over Time
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Notes: The vertical red line indicates the date of introduction of NREGA. The black line
reports the estimated elasticity of manufacturing wage with respect to monsoon rainfall for
each year before and after the introduction of NREGA. The dotted black lines indicate the
90% confidence intervals. The red dashed lines report the coeﬃcients obtained from the
interaction of monsoon rainfall with the NREGA treatment dummy. Sample is restricted
to NREGA-implementation Phases 1 and 2.
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Figure 4: Share of Tradable Output across Districts
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Notes: For each district, the share of tradable output is computed as total manufacturing
output in industries classified as tradable divided by total district manufacturing output.
The figure plots the distribution across Indian districts.
Figure 5: Share of Tradable Output across NREGA Phases
0
20
40
60
Pe
rc
en
t
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Share of Tradable District Output
Phase 1 Phase 2
Phase 3
Notes: For each district, the share of tradable output is computed as total manufac-
turing output in industries classified as tradable divided by total district manufacturing
output. The figure plots the distribution across Indian districts separately by NREGA-
implementation-phase.
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Figure 6: Cross-Section Variation in NREGA Statutory Wage
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Notes: Actual NREGA mean daily wages for each state-year are computed using the NSS
Employment and Unemployment Survey (Wave 64). For each NREGA worker, actual
wage being paid is computed as total earnings in NREGA public work divided by the
number of days in NREGA public work. NREGA statutory wages were assembled using
multiple administrative sources, including the notifications of NREGA wage revisions
available in the Gazette of India – see the Data Section for more details.
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Figure 7: Over-Time Variation in NREGA Statutory Wage
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Notes: Actual NREGA mean daily wages for each state-year are computed using the
NSS Employment and Unemployment Survey (Waves 64, 66 and 68). For each NREGA
worker, actual wage being paid is computed as total earnings in NREGA public work
divided by the number of days in NREGA public work. NREGA statutory wages were
assembled using multiple administrative sources, including the notifications of NREGA
wage revisions available in the Gazette of India – see the Data Section for more details.
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Table 1: ASI Summary Statistics
Characteristics Mean Median p10 p90 S.D.
Number of Workers 68.47 23.00 7.00 144.00 155.87
Value of Output (Millions Rupees) 109.71 10.47 0.70 197.09 445.21
Fixed Capital (Millions Rupees) 36.24 2.03 0.15 48.22 178.01
Daily Wage (Rupees) 143.26 108.30 60.14 256.27 120.34
Output per Worker (Millions Rupees) 1.26 0.46 0.05 2.88 3.16
Capital to Labor Ratio 8.50 3.14 0.37 16.80 44.69
TABLE - ASI SUMMARY STATISTICS
Notes: Sample refers to the years 2000-2001 to 2009-2010 and is restricted to rural areas.
All estimates are obtained using sampling weights.
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Table 2: ASI Summary Statistics by Industry Type
All Industries
Non-tradable 
Industries
Tradable 
Industries
Number of Workers 68.47 60.04 99.31
(155.9) (138.2) (205.2)
Value of Output (Millions Rupees) 109.7 98.68 150.1
(445.2) (426.0) (507.4)
Fixed Capital (Millions Rupees) 36.24 31.67 52.90
(178.0) (171.3) (199.8)
Daily Wage (Rupees) 143.3 135.9 170.7
(120.3) (113.5) (139.4)
Output per Worker (Millions Rupees) 1.264 1.283 1.193
(3.158) (3.354) (2.301)
Capital to Labor Ratio 8.496 8.621 8.034
(44.69) (49.24) (20.51)
TABLE - ASI SUMMARY STATISTICS BY INDUSTRY TYPE
Notes: Sample refers to the years 2000-2001 to 2009-2010 and is restricted to rural areas.
All estimates are obtained using sampling weights.
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Table 3: ASI Summary Statistics by NREGA Phase
All Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
Number of Workers 67.00 62.76 56.01 71.86
(150.8) (155.4) (141.9) (151.8)
Value of Output (Millions Rupees) 109.7 86.89 97.06 121.2
(445.1) (370.0) (438.3) (468.6)
Fixed Capital (Millions Rupees) 36.43 33.93 34.61 37.81
(178.9) (178.0) (194.1) (174.3)
Daily Wage (Rupees) 143.2 120.0 132.0 154.3
(120.3) (91.82) (110.1) (129.7)
Output per Worker (Millions Rupees) 1.268 1.059 1.168 1.368
(3.162) (2.091) (2.714) (3.555)
Capital to Labor Ratio 8.548 8.746 10.13 7.997
(45.19) (22.00) (91.99) (23.74)
ABLE - ASI SUMMARY TATISTICS BY NREGA HASE
Panel A: All Industries
Notes: Sample refers to the years 2000-2001 to 2009-2010 and is restricted to rural areas.
All estimates are obtained using sampling weights.
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Table 4: Tradable Industries
Industry 
Code Industry Description
Tradable 
Industry Output 
/ Total Industry 
Output
Industry Output 
/ Total Output 
Across 
Industries
30 Office, Accounting and Computing Machinery 1.00 0.01
32 Radio, Television and Communication Equipment and Apparatus 1.00 0.02
33 Medical, Precision and Optical Instruments,Watches and Clocks 1.00 0.00
16 Tobacco Products 1.00 0.01
17 Textiles 0.94 0.11
31 Electrical Machinery and Apparatus N.E.C. 0.91 0.04
35 Other Transport Equipment 0.83 0.02
34 Motor Vehicles, Trailers and Semi-Trailers 0.68 0.04
29 Machinery and Equipment N.E.C. 0.43 0.04
19 Tanning and Dressing of Leather; Luggage, Handbags and Footwear 0.41 0.01
24 Chemicals and Chemical Products 0.34 0.15
36 Furniture; Manufacturing N.E.C. 0.32 0.01
22 Publishing, Printing and Reproduction of Recorded Media 0.11 0.00
18 Wearing Apparel; Dressing and Dyeing of Fur 0.02 0.01
15 Food Products and Beverages 0.01 0.21
20 Wood and of Products of Wood and Cork, Except Furniture 0.00 0.01
23 Coke, Refined Petroleum Products and Nuclear Fuel 0.00 0.03
26 Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 0.00 0.06
28 Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery and Equipments 0.00 0.03
27 Basic Metals 0.00 0.13
25 Rubber and Plastic Products 0.00 0.05
21 Paper and Paper Product 0.00 0.02
TABLE - TRADABLE NDUSTRIES
Notes: Figures are computed from ASI data. Sample refers to the years 2000-2001 to
2009-2010 and is restricted to rural areas. All estimates are obtained using sampling
weights.
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Table 5: Rainfall and Agricultural Productivity
(1) (2)
Log(Rainfall) 0.178*** 0.192***
(0.020) (0.019)
Log(Rainfall) x Share Irrigated Land -0.150***
(0.017)
Observations 6,763 6,469
District FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Notes: Unit of observation is a district-year. Rainfall refers to total rainfall in 
June-September. Log crop yield is a weighted average of yields for crops 
consistently cultivated in the district during all the years in which the data are 
available, with area cultivated under a given crop used as weight. The variable 
Share Irrigated Land has been transformed to have mean zero and standard 
deviation one. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. *** p<0.01 ** 
p<0.05 * p<0.1
Log(Crop Yield)
TABLE - RAINFALL AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY
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Table 6: Wage Elasticity
All Agricultural Non-Agricultural
(1) (2) (3)
Log(Rainfall) 0.080*** 0.050*** 0.111***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.030)
Observations 89,429 44,955 44,474
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Phase-Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Log(Wage)
TABLE - WAGE ELASTICITY
Notes: Unit of observation is an individual. Sample is restricted to individuals 
aged 18 to 60. The regression includes controls for age, gender, landholdings 
and crop season. Rainfall refers to total rainfall in June-September. Standard 
errors are clustered at the district level. All estimates are obtained using 
sampling weights. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Consumption Elasticity
All Goods Food Non-Food Manufactured Goods
(1) (2) (3) (3)
Log(Rainfall) 0.069*** 0.015 0.125*** 0.079***
(0.021) (0.023) (0.029) (0.022)
Observations 83,212 83,176 83,206 83,205
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Phase-Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log(Per Capita Consumption Expenditure)
TABLE - CONSUMPTION ELASTICITY
Notes: Unit of observation is a household. The regression includes controls for landholdings and 
crop season. Rainfall refers to total rainfall in June-September. Standard errors are clustered at 
the district level. All estimates are obtained using sampling weights. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1
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Table 8: Firm Production and Employment Elasticities
Log(Value of Output) Log(Man-days) Log(Workers) Log(Wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Rainfall) 0.122** 0.066*** 0.058*** 0.056***
(0.049) (0.025) (0.022) (0.017)
Observations 17,296 17,270 17,284 17,270
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Phase-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Phase-Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
TABLE - FIRM PRODUCTION AND EMPLOYMENT ELASTICITIES
Notes: Unit of observation is a district-industry-year. Industry is defined at the NIC 4-digit level. District-industry-
year measures are obtained using sampling weights and are weighted in the regression by the corresponding weight. 
Rainfall refers to total rainfall in June-September. Value of output is in nominal terms. Number of workers and man-
days include all types of firm employees. Wage refers to average real daily wage across firms -- CPI for Agricultural 
Labourers is used. Daily wage at the firm level is obtained as total compensation during the year divided by total 
number of man-days. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1
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Table 10: The Eﬀect of NREGA on the Rainfall-Dependence of Agricultural Productivity
and Public Employment
Log(Crop Yield) Days in Public Employment
(1) (2)
Log(Rainfall) 0.178*** -0.008
(0.020) (0.013)
Log(Rainfall) x NREGA 0.000 -0.026***
(0.003) (0.009)
Observations 6,763 881,601
District FE Yes Yes
Phase-Year FE Yes Yes
TABLE - THE EFFECT OF NREGA ON THE RAINFALL-DEPENDENCE OF 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY AND PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
Notes: Unit of observation is a district-year in Column 1 and an individual 
in Column 2. In Column 2, sample is restricted to individuals aged 18 to 60. 
The regression in include controls for age, gender, years of schooling, 
landholdings and crop season. Rainfall refers to total rainfall in June-
September. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. All estimates 
are obtained using sampling weights. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 11: The Eﬀect of NREGA on Wage ElasticityTABLE - THE EFFECT OF NREGA ON WAGE ELASTICITY
Log(Wage)
All Agricultural Non-Agricultural
(1) (2) (3)
Log(Rainfall) 0.062*** 0.057*** 0.075***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.021)
Log(Rainfall) x NREGA -0.053*** -0.047*** -0.049***
(0.013) (0.018) (0.018)
Observations 193,602 92,106 101,496
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Phase-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Unit of observation is an individual. Sample is restricted to individuals aged 
18 to 60. The regression includes controls for age, gender, years of schooling, 
landholdings and crop season. Rainfall refers to total rainfall in June-September. 
Standard errors are clustered at the district level. All estimates are obtained using 
sampling weights. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 12: The Eﬀect of NREGA on Consumption Elasticity
All Goods Food Non-Food Manufactured Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Rainfall) 0.056*** 0.028** 0.083*** 0.063***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.017) (0.014)
log(Rainfall) x NREGA -0.052*** -0.043*** -0.060*** -0.034***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.015) (0.012)
Observations 223,323 223,254 223,315 223,313
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Phase-Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Unit of observation is a district-year in Column 1 and an individual in Columns 2-5. In Columns 2-5, 
sample is restricted to individuals aged 18 to 60. The regressions in 2-5 include controls for age, gender, 
landholdings and crop season. Rainfall refers to total rainfall in June-September. Standard errors are clustered 
at the district level. All estimates are obtained using sampling weights. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Log(Per Capita Consumption Expenditure)
TABLE - THE EFFECT OF REGA ON CONSUMPTION ELASTICITY
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Table 15: Robustness Checks: Alternative Rainfall Measures
Log(Value of Output) Log(Man-days) Log(Workers) Log(Wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Rainfall Shock 0.060* 0.030* 0.025* 0.037***
(0.032) (0.016) (0.014) (0.008)
Rainfall Deviation 0.143** 0.081*** 0.072*** 0.060***
(0.058) (0.027) (0.024) (0.018)
Observations 17,296 17,296 17,270 17,270 17,284 17,284 17,270 17,270
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Phase-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Phase-Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Unit of observation is a district-industry-year. Industry is defined at the NIC 4-digit level. District-industry-year measures are 
obtained using sampling weights and are weighted in the regression by the corresponding weight. The variable Rainfall Shock equals 
one if monsoon rainfall is greater than the district’s eightieth percentile of monsoon rainfall, zero if between the twentieth and 
eightieth percentiles, and minus one if below the twentieth percentile. The variable Rainfall Deviation is the fractional deviation 
from the the district’s mean monsoon rainfall. Value of output is in nominal terms. Number of workers and man-days include all 
types of firm employees. Wage refers to average real daily wage across firms -- CPI for Agricultural Labourers is used. Daily wage 
at the firm level is obtained as total compensation during the year divided by total number of man-days. The specification includes 
the standardized district share of irrigated land and district share of population in agriculture interacted with the rainfall variable. 
Analysis is restricted to a balanced panel of districts with at least 20 percent of population in agriculture. Standard errors are 
clustered at the district level. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1
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Table 18: Placebo Test: Elasticities with Respect to Non-Monsoon Rainfall
Log(Crop Yield) Log(Value of Output) Log(Man-days) Log(Workers) Log(Wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log(Non-Monsoon Rainfall) 0.015** -0.026 -0.033 -0.027 -0.016
(0.007) (0.023) (0.023) (0.020) (0.010)
Observations 6,763 17,296 17,270 17,284 17,270
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Phase-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Phase-Industry FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Unit of observation is a district-year in Column 1 and a district-industry-year in Columns 2-5. Industry is defined at the NIC 4-digit level. 
District-industry-year measures are obtained using sampling weights and are weighted in the regression by the corresponding weight. Rainfall 
refers to total rainfall in months other than June-September. Value of output is in nominal terms. Number of workers and man-days include all 
types of firm employees. Wage refers to average real daily wage across firms -- CPI for Agricultural Labourers is used. Daily wage at the firm 
level is obtained as total compensation during the year divided by total number of man-days.Standard errors are clustered at the district level. *** 
p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1
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Table 19: Robustness Check: Firm Elasticities by Input-Output Linkage
Linked Non-linked Non-linked Non-Tradable
Non-linked 
Tradable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Rainfall) 0.140 0.119** 0.150** -0.059
(0.110) (0.054) (0.065) (0.063)
Log(Rainfall) 0.148* 0.055* 0.106*** -0.087
(0.078) (0.028) (0.034) (0.061)
Log(Rainfall) 0.171** 0.038 0.087*** -0.098
(0.071) (0.026) (0.029) (0.063)
Observations 2,980 14,304 10,632 3,672
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Phase-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Phase-Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log(Value of Output)
Log(Man-days)
Log(Workers)
TABLE - FIRM ELASTICITIES BY INPUT-OUTPUT LINKAGE
Notes: Unit of observation is a district-industry-year. Industry is defined at the NIC 4-
digit level. District-industry-year measures are obtained using sampling weights and are 
weighted in the regression by the corresponding weight. Rainfall refers to total rainfall 
in June-September. Value of output is in nominal terms. Number of workers and man-
days include all types of firm employees. Wage refers to average real daily wage across 
firms -- CPI for Agricultural Labourers is used. Daily wage at the firm level is obtained 
as total compensation during the year divided by total number of man-days. Standard 
errors are clustered at the district level. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1
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Table 20: Robustness Check: Accounting for Spatial Correlation
Log(Value of Output) Log(Man-days) Log(Workers) Log(Wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Rainfall) 0.122** 0.066** 0.058* 0.056***
(0.049) (0.033) (0.031) (0.015)
Observations 17,296 17,270 17,284 17,270
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Phase-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Phase-Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Unit of observation is a district-industry-year. Industry is defined at the NIC 4-digit level. District-industry-year 
measures are obtained using sampling weights and are weighted in the regression by the corresponding weight. 
Rainfall refers to total rainfall in June-September. Value of output is in nominal terms. Number of workers and man-
days include all types of firm employees. Wage refers to average real daily wage across firms -- CPI for Agricultural 
Labourers is used. Daily wage at the firm level is obtained as total compensation during the year divided by total 
number of man-days. The specification includes the standardized district share of irrigated land and district share of 
population in agriculture interacted with log-transformed rainfall. Analysis is restricted to a balanced panel of districts 
with at least 20 percent of population in agriculture. Standard errors are clustered at the region-year level. *** p<0.01 
** p<0.05 * p<0.1
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